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Abstract We report experiments investigating how experience influences the
endowment effect. Our experiments feature endowments which are bundles of
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items from their endowment is influenced by prior experiences of tasting the goods
in question and by prior experiences of choosing between them. We do not find a
statistically significant endowment effect in our baseline treatment and, because of
this, we are unable to test for an effect of consumption experience. We do find an
endowment effect when the endowment is acquired in two instalments and, in this
setting, we find some evidence that choice experience increases trading. In a follow-
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baseline treatment is due to subjects being more willing to swap when they do not
have to give up the last unit of their endowment.
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1 Introduction
We present new experiments studying determinants of the ‘endowment effect’ (see
Thaler 1980; Kahneman et al. 1990, 1991). We use the term to refer to a behavioural
tendency for people to value goods more highly when they own them, relative to
when they do not. The simplest experiments demonstrating endowment effects
involve variants of Knetsch’s (1989) ‘swapping task’. When subjects are randomly
endowed with one of two items and then given the opportunity to swap their
endowment for the other item, the majority choose not to swap. This is an anomaly
relative to standard preference theory which predicts a trading rate of 50%. Studies
which show that willingness-to-accept valuations for goods are often significantly
higher than willingness-to-pay valuations have also been interpreted as evidence of
endowment effects.1 Endowment effects have been found for both a wide range of
goods (lotteries, mugs, candy, toys, memorabilia, stationery, food and drink) and
subjects (children, undergraduates, and non-student adults).
Although the endowment effect has been widely observed, evidence suggests it
may be eroded by certain kinds of experience. Much of the existing evidence relates
to the influence of various forms of market experience. For example, when
valuations are elicited repeatedly in experimental markets, the gap between
willingness-to-accept and willingness-to-pay usually decays (e.g. Shogren et al.
2001; Loomes et al. 2003). List (2003, 2004) reports that experienced traders in a
naturally occurring market show no endowment effect. Engelmann and Hollard
(2010) find that subjects who have previously been ‘forced’ to trade exhibit no
endowment effect in subsequent swapping tasks.
We focus on experiences that are separable from market participation. We
investigate two types of experience that arise commonly in daily life and which, we
conjectured, might influence the extent of an endowment effect: these are
experiences arising, respectively, from consuming and from choosing goods. In
the next section, we discuss background theory. Section 3 sets out our experimental
design, Sect. 4 presents results, Sect. 5 reports the results of a follow-up experiment
and Sect. 6 concludes.
2 Background theory
We draw on a theory proposed by Loomes et al. (2009) (henceforth LOS) to
motivate our experiment. LOS propose a model of consumer choice which predicts
the endowment effect as a consequence of two factors: individuals are uncertain
about the utility an alternative will deliver and they are loss averse. In LOS,
preferences are defined over consumption bundles. Each bundle x is a set of
consumption characteristics represented as an act (Savage 1954), which associates a
specific utility Us(x) with each element s, of a state space S. The state space
represents ‘taste uncertainty’ which can arise from extrinsic or intrinsic sources. For
1 Horowitz and McConnell (2002) review many of these studies; see also Plott and Zeiler (2005) and
Isoni et al. (2011) for further discussion of the interpretation of endowment effects.
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example, when in a restaurant and considering the act ‘‘order fish’’, extrinsic
uncertainty may exist in relation to whether the fish will be cooked well or not,
while intrinsic uncertainty might reflect an individual’s lack of clarity about their
own preference (e.g. not being sure whether one is in the mood for fish).2
How LOS explain the endowment effect can be illustrated with a simple
example. Imagine a choice between two acts x and y, defined over two equally
probable states of the world, s1 and s2. Act x yields utility of 1 in s1 and 0 in s2. Act
y yields utility of 0 in s1 and 1 in s2. Assume that y is the status quo and consider the
option of switching to x. Under s1, switching would provide a gain in utility of 1 and
under s2 switching results in a loss in utility of 1. When faced with this uncertainty,
a consumer who is loss-averse in utility would maintain the status quo (regardless of
whether this was x or y); hence, there is an endowment effect.
2.1 The taste uncertainty hypothesis
A distinctive property of the LOS model is that ‘‘the strength of status quo effects is
positively related to the extent of taste uncertainty’’ (LOS, p. 132). The intuition
follows from the previous example. In the absence of taste uncertainty, either s1 or
s2 occurs for sure. The individual then has a strict preference ranking of the two acts
which is independent of the status quo.3 It follows that experiences which reduce
taste uncertainty can, other things equal, weaken the endowment effect. We call this
the taste uncertainty hypothesis and in Sect. 3 we present an experiment designed to
test it.
2.2 The choice experience hypothesis
Our experiment was also designed to test the conjecture that prior experiences of
making choices between specific goods may weaken a subsequent endowment
effect, relative to those goods. We call this conjecture the choice experience
hypothesis. While we do not know of a current theory which specifically predicts
this, more than one plausible psychological mechanism might work in this direction.
One interpretation of the endowment effect is that prior endowments create
biases, causing stated preferences to deviate from underlying preferences (Samuel-
son and Zeckhauser 1988 and Plott 1996 offer interpretations in this spirit). Given a
bias interpretation, it is possible that prior experiences of choosing between a pair of
goods, pre-endowment, could diminish any subsequent endowment effect. Imagine,
for instance, an individual who accumulated multiple experiences via considering
the ranking of a pair of alternatives from different initial endowment positions (e.g.
owning one, owning the other, or owning neither). It seems plausible to suppose that
2 LOS do not presume that an individual is necessarily self-conscious of their intrinsic uncertainty but we
think the restaurant choice example provides an everyday illustration of the underlying idea, consistent
with their model.
3 Taste uncertainty might explain why endowment effects occur for some goods but not others. For
example, Isoni et al. (2011) observe an endowment effect for lotteries (which are intrinsically uncertain)
but not mugs.
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such experiences might provide an individual with perspective on their own
preferences which renders them less susceptible to bias.
In addition to the possible debiasing role of prior choice, other possible
mechanisms might cause prior choice to reduce an endowment effect. For example,
as explained above, in the LOS model the strength of the endowment effect may be
positively related to the degree of intrinsic uncertainty associated with a choice. So,
if making a choice between two goods reduces vacillation in subsequent decisions
over the same pair of goods (perhaps, for instance, because the individual has some
preference for consistency), that would provide another conduit for operation of the
choice experience hypothesis, consistent with the LOS model.
3 The experiment
We test the taste uncertainty hypothesis by investigating whether consumption
experience, in an environment where subjects are uncertain about how much they
will enjoy available alternatives, reduces the endowment effect. We do this by
comparing behaviour in two treatments which we label BASELINE and TASTING.
These two treatments are represented in the left-hand tree in Fig. 1.
Our BASELINE treatment was a variant of Knetsch’s (1989) classic swapping
task, where subjects were randomly allocated one of two possible endowments and
then given the opportunity to either stick or swap. On Fig. 1, the treatment began at
the circular node denoting the random allocation. The swap decision is denoted by
the shaded square nodes. Relative to the classic task, our BASELINE treatment has
two distinguishing features. The first is that the goods which comprised the
endowments were consumption goods selected in the expectation that subjects
would be unsure how much they might like them. The two goods were premium
organic vegetable crisps and handmade organic lemonade (for full details see the
supplementary materials). The goods were supplied by specialist wholesalers and
had similar retail prices of approximately £2. The limited availability and premium
nature of the goods meant that subjects were unlikely to have tasted them before.
The second distinctive feature of our BASELINE treatment was that each
endowment was a bundle of goods rather than a single object: each subject was
randomly endowed with either a ‘crisps-rich’ bundle consisting of two packets of
crisps and a single bottle of lemonade (which we denote ccl) or a ‘lemonade-rich’
bundle consisting of a single packet of crisps and two bottles of lemonade (denoted
cll). The rationale for using bundles is explained below.
The TASTING treatment was identical to the BASELINE treatment except that
each subject consumed a small amount of the two goods before being endowed with
their bundle. Starting at the top of Fig. 1, the treatment began with a subject tasting
samples of each good. The experimenter then allocated one of the two endowments
at random. This procedure placed each subject at one of the shaded decision nodes
where they were faced with a choice between sticking with their allocated
endowment or swapping it for the other one. This decision determined a final
allocation which was theirs to keep and take from the experiment.
S. J. Humphrey et al.
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Under conventional preference theory in which endowments play no role, even if
tasting changes a subject’s ranking of the bundles, each subject has a 50% chance of
not being endowed with their most preferred bundle. Hence, we should expect a
50% chance of swapping in both the BASELINE and TASTING treatments.
Given the assumptions that (1) the goods used in our experiment are ones for
which individuals would have taste uncertainty and that (2) consuming small
quantities of these goods would reduce taste uncertainty, the comparison of
behaviour in the BASELINE and TASTING treatments provides a simple test of the
hypothesis that taste uncertainty contributes to the endowment effect. On that
hypothesis, we should expect the endowment effect to be relatively weaker in the
TASTING treatment.
Our second main objective was to test the choice experience hypothesis. Our test
involves a comparison of two treatments which we label CHOOSING and
PASSIVE. These treatments employ a novel variant of the swapping task that
involves sequences of choices. It facilitates a test of the choice experience
hypothesis by requiring subjects to choose between the two goods en route to their
endowment while, nevertheless, ensuring that they receive a random endowment of
goods before facing the swap decision.
The PASSIVE and CHOOSING treatments are described by the right-hand tree
in Fig. 1. The only difference between them is what happened at the first node at the
top of the figure. In CHOOSING, the first node was a decision node at which
subjects chose either one packet of crisps or one bottle of lemonade, which they
were then physically given. A random device then determined a ‘top-up’ to their
endowment, so that with equal probability they would find themselves with either a
crisps-rich or a lemonade-rich bundle.4 This placed the subject at one of the four
shaded choice nodes in the lower part of Fig. 1. Subjects then chose whether to stick
with their endowment or swap it for the other bundle. The PASSIVE treatment was
ccl
ccl cll
st ick swap
cll
cll ccl
st ick swap
Random
Bundle
ccl
ccl cll
st ick swap
cll
cll ccl
st ick swap
Random
Top-up
ccl
ccl cll
st ick swap
cll
cll ccl
st ick swap
Random
Top-up
TASTING or
Random
Item
Choice
CHOOSING and PASSIVEBASELINE and TASTING
Crisps Lemonade
cl ccll cl
Fig. 1 The treatments
4 Subjects were not told the distribution of the top-ups, so did not know their choice would have no effect
on their second-stage allocation.
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exactly the same, except that the initial component of the endowment (at the first
node) was determined by chance rather than by the subject’s own choice.
This ‘‘top-up’’ method ensures that the bundle held at the point of the swap
decision is randomly determined in both the PASSIVE and CHOOSING treatments,
and note that it is independent of the initial choice in the latter. Hence, the
prediction of a 50% swap rate based on standard theory applies to both. Comparing
behaviour between these treatments provides a test of the choice experience
hypothesis. On that hypothesis, we should expect more swaps in the CHOOSING
treatment than in the PASSIVE treatment.
To test our hypotheses, 210 subjects recruited at the University of Nottingham,
were randomly assigned to our four treatments. Each treatment had around 50
subjects. For an effect size with Cohen’s h = 0.5 (approximately the difference
between a 0.25 and a 0.5 swap rate) and a 0.05 significance level, the power is 80%
for within treatment tests (i.e. tests for an endowment effect) and 70% for between
treatment tests (i.e. tests for differences in swap rates). Following the swap decision,
each subject completed a questionnaire. This provides information on individual
characteristics which we exploit in the analysis of Sect. 4. Full details of the goods,
the tasks and the scripts followed by the experimenters are described in the
supplementary materials.
4 Results
Table 1 reports swap rates by treatment. The Endowments column shows the
number of subjects initially endowed with each of the two bundles. The Swaps
column reports the total number of swaps and (in parentheses) the number of swaps
in each possible direction: swapping crisps for lemonade (c ? l) or lemonade for
crisps (c / l). The Swap rate is the proportion of subjects who swapped. The final
column reports p-values for Boschloo tests of the null hypothesis (based on standard
preference theory) that the final allocation is independent of endowment (i.e. there is
Table 1 Endowments and trading by treatment
Treatment N Endowments (ccl, cll) Swaps total (c ? l, c / l) Swap rate p value
BASELINE 50 (25, 25) 21 (10, 11) 0.42 0.1611
TASTING 56 (27, 29) 26 (16, 10) 0.46 0.3460
Total 106 (52, 54) 47 (26, 21) 0.44 0.1394
PASSIVE 52 (26, 26) 12 (6, 6) 0.23 0.0001
CHOOSING 52 (22, 30) 18 (8, 10) 0.35 0.0177
Total 104 (48, 56) 30 (14, 16) 0.29 0.0000
All 210 (100, 110) 77 (40, 37) 0.37 0.0001
S. J. Humphrey et al.
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50% swapping rate), against the alternative hypothesis that there is an endowment
effect (i.e. the swap rate is less than 50%).5
We comment first on the results for the BASELINE and TASTING treatments.
While the swap rates for these treatments have the expected pattern with
BASELINE\TASTING\ 0.5, neither has a statistically significant endowment
effect. The absence of an endowment effect in the BASELINE treatment is
noteworthy, and we examine this further in Sect. 5. Its absence, however, means
that we cannot conduct a meaningful test of the taste experience hypothesis (which
would require us to look for a reduction of the endowment effect in TASTING
relative to BASELINE).
We now test the choice experience hypothesis by comparing behaviour between
the PASSIVE and CHOOSING treatments. There is a significant endowment effect
in the PASSIVE treatment (the trading rate is only 0.23) and the experience of
choosing weakens it. In line with the choice experience hypothesis, the trading rate
rises to 0.35 for the CHOOSING treatment where subjects are approximately 50%
more likely to trade. This treatment difference just fails to reach significance at the
10% level (p = 0.1023, Boschloo test with one-sided alternative hypothesis) though
we do also find a (weakly) significant effect of choice experience in the individual-
level analysis below (see analysis of Table 2).
An unanticipated feature of our results is the difference between the treatments in
which the acquisition of endowments occurred in two steps (PASSIVE,
CHOOSING), rather than one step (BASELINE, TASTING). While 44% of
subjects swapped in the one-step treatments, only 29% of subjects did so in two-step
treatments (p = 0.0190, Boschloo test with two-sided alternative hypothesis).
Comparing the BASELINE and PASSIVE treatments, which control for the
experiences of choosing between and tasting the goods, respectively 42% and 23%
of subjects swapped their endowment (p = 0.0461, Boschloo test, two-sided
alternative hypothesis). These tests provide evidence that acquiring an endowment
in stages strengthens the endowment effect. We think this is an intriguing discovery
and briefly discuss its interpretation and potential significance in Sect. 6.
We supplement the analysis of treatment effects by using logit regression
(following List 2003) to model the probability that a subject swaps, taking account of
individual characteristics. Observations from all treatments are pooled. This provides
a clear overall view of treatment effects within the models we estimate (specifically
models 3 and 5) and increases the statistical power of the tests. Across different
specifications, as independent variables, we included a dummy for the treatment, the
individual experiences, plus a set of individual-level characteristics elicited in the
post-decision questionnaire, including age and gender. We also included a measure
of individual-level loss aversion constructed by ranking subjects’ from least to most
loss averse based on their responses to a series of hypothetical tasks (see
supplementary materials). The results are reported in Table 2.
5 The Boschloo test was chosen for two reasons. First, it is an exact test. Unlike the Z-test of proportions
or the Chi squared test, the Boschloo test does not rely on using an approximation of the test statistic’s
distribution. Second, unlike Fisher’s exact test, the Boschloo test does not rely on contingency
tables having fixed row and column totals. In the experiment, the row totals (number of subjects in a
treatment) were fixed, but the column totals (e.g. total trades across treatments) were not.
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Model 1, which includes only a constant, provides a simple econometric test for
the presence of an endowment effect. The highly significant negative coefficient
confirms the presence of an endowment effect in our data.
In all three models that include individual-level characteristics (models 2, 4 and
5), the coefficient for measured loss aversion is negative (other characteristics are
never significant). Tests of the null hypothesis that the swap rate is independent of
loss aversion are rejected at the 5% level (model 2, p = 0.0436; model 4,
p = 0.0424; model 5, p = 0.0369). Hence, in these data, more loss averse
individuals were less likely to trade. While this result supports theories, including
LOS, which invoke loss aversion to explain the endowment effect, we note that we
do not replicate this association in the follow-up study reported in Sect. 5.
Models 3 and 5 provide evidence that the experience of choosing part of the
endowment increases the trading rate (and reduces the endowment effect). Tests of
the null hypothesis that the trading rates in the PASSIVE and CHOOSING
treatments are equal are rejected at the 10% level in favour of the alternative
hypothesis that the trading rate is higher in the CHOOSING treatment (model 3,
p = 0.0898; model 5, p = 0.0894).
Finally, this analysis confirms that acquiring endowments in two steps decreases
the trading rate (increases the endowment effect). This is evidenced by the
significant negative coefficients on PASSIVE in models 3 and 5 and by the
significant coefficient for ‘Two-step’ in model 4.
5 Follow-up experiment
A notable feature of the above results is our failure to find a significant endowment
effect in our BASELINE treatment, which is closest to the classic swapping task of
Knetsch (1989). In this section, we report a simple follow-up experiment designed
to diagnose that result.6
The most obvious difference between our experiment and other comparable
studies which have found an endowment effect is that we endowed subjects with
bundles of goods rather than single items. For instance, in Knetsch’s study, subjects
who swapped their endowment were giving up their only mug or only chocolate bar;
whereas, in our experiment, subjects were giving up only one of two packets of
crisps or one of two bottles of lemonade. It is possible that loss aversion may be
more acute in situations where one would be giving up the last unit of a good.
However, since there is some evidence that the extent of an endowment effect may
depend on the nature of the goods being traded (e.g. Isoni et al. 2011), another
possibility is that the absence of an endowment effect in our BASELINE treatment
is explained by features of the relatively unfamiliar goods which subjects
encountered in our experiment. Our follow-up experiment discriminates between
these possibilities.
The follow-up experiment had two treatments. The first replicated our original
BASELINE treatment; the second was the same except that endowments were
6 We thank the editor and a referee for suggesting we develop a diagnostic follow-up experiment.
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single items of one or other of two unfamiliar goods (as in our original experiment,
the two goods were either a bottle of an unfamiliar brand of lemonade or a packet of
an unfamiliar brand of vegetable crisps). The experiments were conducted at the
University of Exeter. A total of 184 subjects participated, with 92 in each treatment.
Within each treatment, half of the subjects had each endowment. We used more
subjects per treatment in the follow-up experiment to increase statistical power. If
the effect size has Cohen’s h = 0.4 (approximately the difference between a 0.3 and
a 0.5 swap rate) and the significance level is 0.05, 92 subjects per treatment gives
99% power for within treatment tests for an endowment effect and 77% power for
between treatment tests for differences in swap rates. Testing for smaller effect sizes
requires considerably more observations.
In the baseline replication (with bundles), there were 39 swaps (28 to lemonade,
11 to crisps). This replicates the BASELINE finding reported in Sect. 4: the swap
rate (0.42 in the follow-up) is very similar and there is no statistically significant
endowment effect. In the single items treatment, there were 33 swaps (31 to
lemonade, 2 to crisps). The swap rate was 0.36, giving a statistically significant
endowment effect (p = 0.0003, Boschloo test with one-sided alternative hypoth-
esis). These results clearly implicate the use of bundles (as opposed to unfamiliar
goods) as the culprit for eliminating the endowment effect in our original
BASELINE treatment.7
6 Discussion and conclusion
Our initial design was set up to test two hypotheses partly motivated by existing
theory and evidence: the taste uncertainty hypothesis and the choice experience
hypothesis.
We find some evidence that the experience of having made a straight choice
between a pair of goods reduces the endowment effect observed in a later swap task
involving those same goods. While we have found only modest support for this
effect, there is a case for further investigation because the operation of it appears to
cohere with emerging theory and evidence. From a theoretical viewpoint, the choice
experience hypothesis can be interpreted as an implication of the LOS model. We
view this theory as an attractive putative account of our data because it models
mechanisms which may explain not only why the endowment effect occurs, but also
why it changes as a consequence of particular types of experience. From an empirical
viewpoint, we see a possible parallel with Engelmann and Hollard (2010). They
conjectured that endowment effects may be partly caused by individuals having
biased assessments of the costs associated with trading (including mental costs
associated with bargaining or deciding). To test this hypothesis, their experiment
forced some subjects to trade before they encountered swapping tasks and subjects
who had traded as a consequence of this ‘therapy’ exhibited no endowment effect.
7 In the follow-up experiment, subjects also completed an incentivized loss aversion elicitation task
(details are included in the supplementary materials). In contrast to the first experiment, we did not find a
statistically significant correlation between measured loss aversion and swapping.
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The reduced endowment effect in our CHOOSING treatment may be evidence that
exercising choice en route to an endowment had a comparable ‘therapeutic’ role.
We were unable to test the taste uncertainty hypothesis because, counter to our
expectations, we found no endowment effect in our BASELINE condition. We
suggested that the most likely candidates for explaining this are one or both of two
differences between our BASELINE treatment and a classic swaps design. The first
candidate is that we used unfamiliar goods and second is that, in order to facilitate
our test of the choice experience hypothesis, subjects chose between bundles of
goods rather than single items. Our follow-up experiment provides clear evidence
that the use of bundles (not the unfamiliarity of the goods) is the factor which most
likely suppressed the endowment effect in our BASELINE treatment. Although it
was not part of our initial strategy to test the influence of bundles, we view this
aspect of our results as identifying a psychologically plausible determinant of the
endowment effect. That is, people are less prone to it when they do not have to give
up their final unit of an endowed good.
A final intriguing finding is that even though there was no endowment effect for
bundles acquired in a single step, it re-emerged for bundles acquired in two steps. This
result, while unanticipated, is possibly related to so-called ‘‘splitting effects’’ reported
across a broad range of decision contexts (e.g. Starmer and Sugden 1993; Humphrey
1995; Bateman et al. 1997; Weber et al. 1988).8 The common feature of splitting
effects is a tendency for a good to be more highly valued when re-described so that
positive attributes are unpacked into sub-components (e.g. the ‘‘high performance’’ of
a carmay be unpacked into sub-categories such as ‘‘acceleration’’, ‘‘handling’’, etc.). If
splitting effects in bundle acquisition do promote endowment effects, the latter may be
particularly pronounced in markets where endowments are built up over time. These
may range frommarkets for relatively low value goods (e.g. memorabilia collections)
through to economically large investments such as building a home or a business.
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